The contents of this page were submitted by Paul Reuter, a Bataan Defender.
(On 29 January 1946,
Gen. Edward P. King Jr. submitted his Luzon Force Operations Report, to
1.a. General Supply
Situation: - Upon my arrival on Bataan and for the period covered by this
report, the Administrative order covering administrative details was in
operation for use of the Luzon Force, which was then occupying the Reserve
Battle Position (Pilar-Bagac Road). Prior to 20 March
1942, certain supplies had been found to be critically inadequate. All troops
b. Foraging for animals was about exhausted.
c. Gasoline and lubricants for motor vehicles were inadequate in appropriate grades and gasoline had been placed on a command control basis. Daily issues of gasoline for motor vehicles were to be further reduced.
d. The operation of
G-4 Section on
2. Class I Supplies: -
As stated above, troops on
3. Class II supplies: -
a.Organization and individual equipment: Many
units of the Philippine Army had reached
4. Class III Supplies: - Gasoline and Lubricating Oils.
a. As stated above, supplies which were inadequate were issued on a control basis and in such a way as to last as long as subsistence supplies could be made to last. Gasoline issues were accordingly reduced from daily issues of about 8,000 gallons per day to about 3,000 gallons per day, during this period. This reduced fuel greatly restricted necessary operation of motor vehicles and heavy construction (road) machinery. Gasoline was not available for use in ambulances to evacuate sick personnel from combat areas, during this period. To better this condition, use was made of surplus aviation high-octane gasoline to mix with kerosene and low octane gasoline, for use in combat tanks and in motor vehicles.
b. Lubricating oils, both in quantity and appropriate grades, were inadequate. It was not practical to change motor oil in vehicles after long use, on account of this scarcity.
c. On date of surrender, there remained about 11,000 gallons of motor fuels and very little lubricating oil of usable grades.
5. Class IV Supplies: - Special Equipment.
a. Engineer Supplies: The Engineers were very well equipped and functioned well in road construction, trail construction, construction of air-fields, docks, operation of a sawmill, etc. The most serious shortage in this service was equipment needed by combat troops for field fortifications. Barbed wire, sandbags, and entrenching tools were inadequate. Shortage in heavy machinery and in motor fuels, and oils, greatly handicapped operations of the Engineers. Building materials for protection from rainy weather (shelter materials) were quite inadequate.
b. Ordnance Supplies: Loss of firearms, including automatic weapons, was high. This caused a shortage of automatic weapons in some organizations. Adequate supply of mortars and 50-caliber machine guns had never been available.
6. Class V Supplies: - Ammunition. At date of surrender, small arms and artillery ammunition for an additional thirty days was available at prior rate of consumption.
a. The Motor Transport Service, as such, was organized about 21 March 1942, at the time of designation and organization of the Luzon Force. Prior to this time, Regular Army units, in general, were well equipped with transportation, while Philippine Army units had only improvised and inadequate means of transportation composed of commandeered commercial vehicles. After about 21 March, a limited number of vehicles were assigned to all units which were entitled to them by basic allowances and the remaining vehicles were organized into four regiment Motor Transport Service. Companies A and B, 12th QM Regiment (PS), formed the nucleus of the 1st Regiment, MTS. The 2ns Regiment was formed from the Air Corps QM units as a nucleus. One QM Company of Air Corps was used in the 4th Regiment. All other motor transports units were made up of commercial vehicles operated by civilian drivers. These civilian drivers gave satisfactory service. The Motor Transport Service had a total of about 1,200 vehicles of which about 200 were military vehicles and the remainder commercial. b. Spare parts for motor vehicles were adequate for the number of vehicles, which were able to operate on the reduced gasoline allowances.
c. Motor greases were about exhausted during this period.
d. Distilled water for use in motor batteries having been exhausted prior to 21 March, the Chemical Warfare Service came to our aid and supplied this water by aid of some of it's chemicals.
e. In general, although motor transportation was rapidly deterioration for lack of lubrication of proper kind, this service was ahead of the motor fuel supply in meeting transportation requirements.
f. Many motor vehicles, including, commercial motor busses, were destroyed, immediately prior to surrender.
8. Destruction of
supplies: - In compliance with orders, supplies, except subsistence and certain
motor vehicles, were destroyed, just prior to surrender. Roy C. Hilton Colonel,
GSC (Inf) Asst.
MEDICAL, SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL
A.(1) The report of the Surgeon, Luzon Force, indicates that the defensive combat efficiency of the Luzon Force had been reduced more that 75% during the final weeks. This was due to malnutrition, avitaminosis, malaria and intestinal infections and infestations. Those men on a duty status were incapable of any long sustained physical effort. Malnutrition had made troops particularly vulnerable to disease. By 2 March 1942, individuals had used up their reserve and they were deteriorating rapidly in the physical sense and by 1 April, the combat efficiency was rapidly approaching the zero point.
The half ration was
inaugurated 6 January. In terms of energy units the ration averaged 2000
calories during January, 1500 calories during February, and 1000 calories
during March. The nature of the terrain in which the defense of
A serious shortage of
drugs for treatment of all types of dysentery and hookworm was existent during
(2) The ailment of
nerve fatigue became prevalent due to constant enemy bombing, shelling, and the
absence of any counter activity, particularly in the air, on the part of our
forces. During the early stages of the defense, it was noted that Philippine
Army stragglers, in rear areas, kept their arms and equipment and could be
rallied and returned to the front. However, during the latter stages of the
defense, stragglers carried neither arms nor equipment, and it was impossible
to return them to the front except by force. They were surly and physically
exhausted, as well as mentally unequal to further combat duty. It had been
impossible to relieve front line troops and send them to quiet areas in the
rear for rest periods, There was no quiet area in